Abstract: In this paper we further study the complexity of of zero-knowledge interactive proofs. We prove that there is an oracle A such that there is a language L which is recognizable by a two round, perfect zero-knowledge interactive proof relative to A, but such that L 6 2 BPP A . This gives interesting implications for what can be demonstrated about zero-knowledge interactive proofs using standard methods.
interactive prover-veri er pair that on input w exchanges at most f(jwj) messages such that: 1.) when w 2 L, the veri er interacting with the prover accepts with probability at least 1 ? 2 ?jwj and, 2.) when w 6 2 L, the veri er interacting with any prover accepts with probability at most 2 ?jwj . Such a prover-veri er pair is called an interactive proof for L.
Let IP = k IP n k ]. Just as in the case when L 2 NP, when L 2 IP, membership in L is e ciently veri able since the veri er runs in polynomial time and determines membership correctly with probability very close to one. However, IP is thought to strictly contain NP since it has recently been shown by Shamir S] that IP = PSPACE.
In addition to de ning interactive proofs, Goldwasser, Micali, and Racko GMR] further de ned zero-knowledge interactive proofs. The zero-knowledge de nition was motivated by cryptographic considerations (see for example, GMR2] , O] , GMW]). Informally, a prover is zero-knowledge for a language if the prover reveals no useful information (other than language membership) when interacting with any veri er. Slightly more formally, a prover is zero-knowledge for L if for any veri er there is a probabilistic polynomial time simulator that, on inputs in L, produces conversations with the \same" probability distribution as the prover interacting with that veri er. Actually, three interpretations of \same" lead to three types of zero-knowledge, each more restrictive than the next. When \same" is informally interpreted as: 1.) identical, 2.) almost identical, or 3.) equivalent with respect to probabilistic polynomial time, then the prover is said to be perfect zero-knowledge, statistical zero-knowledge, or computational zero-knowledge for L, respectively. A language, L, is in PZK (SZK, CZK) if there is an interacting prover-veri er pair which is an interactive proof for L with the additional property that the prover is perfect (statistical, computational) zero-knowledge for L.
In this paper we continue the investigation of the complexity-theoretic implications of the zero-knowledge de nitions. Requiring that, for inputs in the language, the conversations between the prover and every veri er be accurately reproducible by some random polynomial time machine would seem to be a severe constraint on the power of the prover and hence the power of the zero-knowledge model. Surprisingly, for computational zeroknowledge this is probably not the case. Through the work of GMW], BGGHKMR], IY] it has been shown that, assuming secure encryption exists, any interactive proof can be transformed into a computational zero-knowledge proof, i.e., CZK = IP.
However, the inuition that zero-knowledge is very restrictive seems to be correct for statistical and perfect zero-knowledge. Fortnow F] was the rst to provide evidence that the statistical zero-knowledge requirement may restrict the power of the prover. He proved that if a language has a statistical zero-knowledge proof, then the complement of the language has a bounded round interactive proof, i. The rst result is weaker than the second but the former oracle seems to have the interesting property that SZK 6 = PZK. Even though we cannot prove this last property there is still an interesting observation to be made. All known statistical zero-knowledge proofs have been converted to perfect zero-knowledge proofs by letting the simulator run for a long time with exponentially small probability. This procedure is not possible for our language.
Finally, our results in conjuction with a result of Oren O] give evidence that the original de nition of zero-knowledge proposed in GMR] is in fact less restrictive then the auxilary input model proposed in sereral papers O], TW], GMR2]. Oren showed that in the auxillary input model CZK 2] = BPP. Our results hold in a model which is only slightly less restrictive than the auxiliary input model (and more restrictive than the original de nition). We can conclude that any proof of equivalence between the various models cannot relativize.
The content of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we give the necessary de nitions and notation. In section 3 we construct an oracle such that SZK A 2] 6 = BPP A and in section 4 we show how to modify this construction to make the protocol perfect zero-knowledge.
Notation and De nitions
In this section we give the formal de nitions needed for the paper. Let P denote a prover: any probabilistic Turing machine which has a \communication" tape (for a formal de nition of a \communication" tape see GMR]). P has no resource bounds. Let V denote a veri er: any probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine with a communication tape. Let P $V denote an interacting prover-veri er pair: any prover and veri er which share the same input tape and communication tape (initially empty) and interact in rounds in the following way.
(1) The veri er, V , makes a probabilistic polynomial time computation based on the input, the contents of its memory, and all messages thus far received over the communication tape from the prover, P. (2) V transmits the result of the computation over the communication tape to P. We will denote the message sent by V in round i by x 2i?1 . (3) P performs a probabilistic computation based on the input, and all messages thus far received over the communication tape from V . (4) P transmits the result of the computation over the communication tape to V . We will denote the message sent by P in round i by y 2i . The interaction is terminated by the veri er accepting or rejecting after at most a polynomial (in the input length) number of rounds.
Let P$V (w) denote a transcript of the interaction between the prover and the veri er. This is of course a stochastic variable depending on P's and V 's random choices.
De nition: A given P$V is -complete for a language, L, if for all w 2 L the probability that V accepts on w is at least .
De nition: A veri er, V , is -sound for a language, L, if for all P 0 $V and all w = 2 L the probability that V rejects on w is at least . 
Zero-Knowledge
In this section we will give the formal de nition of a zero-knowledge interactive proof for a language. We will rst need some properties of probability distributions on strings.
Let A(w) and B(w) be two parameterized discrete random variables. where C n is the circuit of C which takes inputs of size n.
We have already seen what it means for an interacting prover-veri er pair to be an interactive proof for a language. In a cryptographic setting, however, we may require more from our protocol than just completeness and soundness. We may want the prover to give nothing to any veri er (even those not following the protocol) that the veri er could not have computed itself. To formalize this GMR1] introduced the important concept of a simulator. A simulator, M, is a random Turing machine that produces strings, i.e., \conversations," in expected polynomial time.
Let M(w) be the random variable associated with M on input w. Recall that P$V (w) is the random variable associated with the conversations produced by P$V on input w.
We will say that P is statistical zero-knowledge for
De ne the class SZK to be those languages, L, for which there exists an interactive prover-veri er pair, P$V , such that:
-sound on L, and 3.) P is statistical zero-knowledge for L. Call such a P$V a statistical zero-knowledge proof for L. By using the de nitions for perfect equivalence and computational equivalence from above we get similar de nitions for perfect zero-knowledge (SZK), and computational zero-knowledge (CZK).
Several papers have noted that the above de nitions may not be restrictive enough. For example, the prover cannot be sure that the veri er's worktapes are empty when both parties receive the input. For example, the worktapes may not have been cleared after the veri er completed a previous interaction with another prover. This was noted in GMR2], O], and TW]. The following de nitions handle these cases.
Let P$V (w; u) denote the random variable for the output of the protocol on input w when V runs in polynomial time in jwj but has additional input u that is unknown to P .
Let M(w; u) be the random variable for the output of the simulator on input w; u where the simulator runs in polynomial time in jwj. P is statistical zero-knowledge 0 on L if 8k 9N such that 8V 0 9M V 0 such that
The requirements for P to be perfect zero-knowledge 0 on L and computational zero-knowledge 0 on L are similar. Now we can de ne the class SZK 0 . The classes PZK 0 and CZK 0 are de ned similarly. A language, L, is in SZK 0 if there exists an interactive prover-veri er pair such that:
-sound on L, and 3.) P is statistical zero-knowledge 0 on L. Call such a P$V a statistical zero-knowledge 0 proof for L.
The zero-knowledge 0 de nitions were designed so that zero-knowledge 0 proofs would be modular. Tompa and Woll TW] demonstated that if a zero-knowledge 0 protocol is iterated sequentially then the resulting protocol is zero-knowledge 0 . Oren O] showed more generally that if a protocol is composed only of zero-knowledge 0 subprotocols then the protocol itself is zero-knowledge 0 .
In this paper we study relativized zero-knowledge proofs. In this case both the prover and the veri er have access to an oracle A. As far as we know this is the rst attempt to study relativized zero-knowledge protocols.
3. An oracle A such that SZK A 2] 6 = BPP A .
In this section we will prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1: There exists an oracle, A, such that SZK A 2] 6 = BPP A .
As is standard for relativized separation arguments, we rst de ne a map from an arbitrary set of strings, A
, to a set of unary strings, L A . We then proceed to show that there exists an A such that L A is in SZK A 2] but not in BPP A . Let a n be the characteristic vector of A \ n . That is, a n i = 1 () i 2 A \ n :
Divide the rst b2 n =3nc of a n into segments of length 3n. We will ignore the remaining portions of a n . Let s j denote the jth segment, i.e., the positions 1 + 3n(j ? 1) to 3nj. For each string, v, of length 3n de ne R v as the segments which have value v: R = fijs i = vg. We will say a n is unique whenever jR v j 1 for all strings v of length 3n. Below we will also need the following de nitions. Call a n redundant whenever there are exactly b p 2 n =3nc v with b p 2 n =3nc jR v j b p 2 n =3nc + 2 and jR v j = 0 for the remaining v. Call a n completely redundant if it is the zero vector of length 2 n .
We de ne the unary language L A as follows:
1 n 2 L A () a n is unique:
We will show that there exists an oracle, A, such that L A 2 SZK A 2] but L A = 2 BPP A . As a rst step let us show that there are many oracles for which L A 2 IP A 2].
Lemma 2: If A is such that for all n either a n is unique, redundant, or completely redundant then L A 2 IP A 2].
Proof: Consider the following interactive protocol. On input 1 n :
1. V uniformly picks a number j between 1 and b2 n =3nc. V asks 3n oracle queries to discover segment s j of a n . Call this 3n bit string c. V sends c to P. 2. If none of the segments of a n are the string c then P responds \you cheat". If c occurs as segment(s) s i 1 ; s i 2 ; : : :; s i l , P returns k 2 fi 1 ; i 2 ; : : :; i l g.
3. If k = j then the veri er accepts, otherwise it rejects.
We have to prove that P can win the game with high probability precisely when 1 n 2 L A . If 1 n 2 L A then by de nition a n is unique and the prover will know that c is the jth segment of a n . Hence, the veri er will accept with probability one. If 1 n = 2 L A then by hypothesis a n is redundant or completely redundant. Hence, there are at least b p 2 n =3nc segments which are the same as c. So, the prover will only be able to guess j of the veri er with probability at most b p 2 n =3nc ?1 .
Henceforth, we will restrict our attention to oracles A such that a n is either unique, redundant, or completely redundant. We have to construct A to simultaneously acheive L A 2 SZK A 2] and L 6 2 BPP A . We will rst treat these two conditions separately and then show how to combine the two requirements.
Diagonalization over BPP
We will use the standard technique of diagonalization. We will need an enumeration of oracle-BPP machines: M A 1 , M A 2 ,: : :. We will set A in rounds so that at round i, M A i will not BPP-recognize L A . We will say that a machine strong BPP-recognizes a language if it erroneously accepts or rejects with probability at most 2 ?n . The following lemma will establish that it is su cient to set A in rounds so that at round i, M A i will not strong BPP-recognize L A .
Lemma 3: Any language, L, in BPP A can be recognized by a machine, M A , which erroneously accepts or rejects with probability at most 2 ?n where n is the length of the input.
Proof: As is standard, M A simulates the machine recognizing L a polynomial number of times and accepts if a majority of the simulations accept. Now back to the diagonalization. We assume without loss of generality that M A i runs in time at most n i on inputs of length n. Will will determine A in rounds by putting strings in and out of the oracle set. A string which has not yet been put in or out of A will be called undetermined. i asks A about a string y we have 3 cases: jyj = n j for j < i, jyj 6 = n j for 1 j i + 1, and jy i j = n i . In the rst case the answer has already been determined in a previous round and in the second case the answer was determined ahead of time. Thus the probability that M A i accepts is only a function of the answers to questions of the third type, i.e., of a n i . Note that no strings of length n i have been set in previus rounds since n i is greater than the running time of M k on 1 n k for k < i. Let p(a n i ) = Pr r M A i accepts 1 n i ] where r is the random coins used by M A i . We have two case 1. There exists a redundant a n i such that p(a n i ) > 2 ?n i . In this case we set A according to this a n i . 2. If no redundant a n i exists with p(a n i ) > 2 ?n i nd a unique a n i with p(a n i ) 1 2 and set A accordingly.
Clearly if this construction is possible we can make any BPP machine make an error. We need only check that part 2 of the construction is possible. Lemma 4 will establish that this is indeed the case. Let U be the set of all a n i which are unique and R be the set of all a n i which are redundant.
Lemma 4: If p(a n i ) 2 ?n i for all a n i 2 R then the fraction of U with p(a n i ) < 1=2 is 1 ? 2 2?n i .
Let us start by giving the intuition behind the proof. Oracle BPP machines behave similarly on both unique and redundant oracle vectors. In essence this is due to the fact that it is di cult for oracle BPP machines to distinguish between unique and redundant oracle vectors. In a redundant vector there are exponentially many di erent values in the segments. It is very unlikely that a BPP machine sampling a polynomial number of segments will nd a pair of segments with identitical value. To make this formal we will x the random coins of M A i and now look at the probability that M A i accepts as a function of random a n i . We have Proof: Once we x the random coins of M A i it becomes deterministic and its computation depends only on a n i . Consider an accepting computation during which M A i examines k segments. Let m R be the number of redundant a n i on which M A i would produce this computation (i.e., which have the same values at those k segments) and let m U be the number of unique a n i on which M A i would produce this same computation. The inequality is obvious in the case when the values of the k segments are not all unique. Now Lemma 5 follows by summing over all possible accepting computations.
Let us now prove Lemma 4. By the hypothesis p(a n i ) 2 ?n i for all a n i 2 R. It follows that Pr r;a n i 2R p(a n i ) 1 2 = Pr a n i 2U
Pr r M A i accepts 1 n i ] 1 2 2 2?n i :
Statistical Zero Knowledge
We have seen how to diagonalize over all oracle BPP machines. Now we will show that for many A the two round protocol for recognizing L A described earlier is in fact a statistical zero knowledge protocol.
We will show that for any veri er, V 0 , there is a polynomial time coin ipping simulator, M A V 0 , which for all 1 n 2 L A produces conversations with close to the same distribution as the P A $ V 0 A protocol. To make precise what is meant by close de ne S V 0 (a n ) as the di erence between the distributions of conversations on input 1 n .
S V 0 (a n ) = where x denotes the veri er's move and y denotes the prover's move. Strictly speaking the value of S V 0 (a n ) does not only depend on a n since V 0 might ask questions of lengths other than n. However, we assume any xed set of answers for stings shorter than n and that any string the veri er asks for of length greater than n gets a negative answer. Observe that this agrees with the situation in the diagonalization over BPP-machines.
To prove that the protocol is SZK we have to prove that S V 0 (a n ) < 1=n c for all c and su ciently large n.
The intuition for the proof is quite clear. If we are dealing with an honest veri er which behaves according to the protocol then for unique a n the veri er does not learn anything when the prover reveals the location of the segment that the veri er itself chose. It is easy to simulate the honest veri er. The simulator simply runs V to get j and c = s j and reports that the prover responds with j. On the other hand, consider a veri er which produces c without looking at the oracle. In this case the veri er could learn the position of c in a n from the prover even though it would be di cult for the veri er to discover this for itself. However, with overwhelming probability c will not be a segment in a n since there are 2 3n strings of length 3n but only b2 n =3nc segments of a n . Thus the simulator could report \you cheat" as the prover's mover and be correct almost always. Let us describe the simulator in more detail.
De nition of simulator : On input 1 n , the simulator runs V 0 A which produces a string c. Next the simulator queries the oracle to obtain all segments of a n in which V 0 A has asked at least one question. If one of these segments is equal to c, M V 0 returns its index as the provers answer and otherwise it returns \you cheat".
Given this de nition of M A
V 0 let's evaluate S V 0 (a n ). Note that V 0 A and M A V 0 produce c with the same distribution. If c is not one of the segments of a n then both the real prover and the simulator prover respond \you cheat". So, the sum over those c which are not segments of a n contributes zero to S V 0 (a n ). Say c is the jth segment of a n and the jth segment was examined by V 0 A during the production of c. This happens with the same probability for both V 0 A and M A V 0 and in both cases the prover's response is j. So again, the sum over such c's contributes zero to S V 0 (a n ). Say, c is the jth segment of a n but the jth segment was not examined during the production of c. Again this occurs with the same probability for both V 0 A and M A V 0 but in the former case the real prover will respond with j and the simulator prover will respond \you cheat". This is the only case the simulator will not be able to simulate.
Let D(r; a n ; c) be the event that the veri er with coins r and oracle vector a n produces c which is a segment of a n but the veri er makes no queries to that segment. By the above argument S V 0 (a n ) reduces to
Pr r D(r; a n ; b)]:
Lemma 6: For any V 0 and any n Pr a n 2U S V 0 (a n ) > 2 2 n 3n ] < 1 2 n Proof: We'll show that the expected value of S V 0 (a n ) taken over a n 2 U is at most 2=2 2n 3n and this implies the lemma. The expectation of S V 0 (a n ) over a n 2 U is 2 jUj X a n X b Pr r D(r; a n ; b)]
Treat the probability over r as a sum over r weighted by 2 ?p where p is the number of coins used by the veri er. Change the order of summation to sum over r rst and c last. Then note that once r and a n are xed c is determined. So ignore the sum over c. We get E (S V 0 (a n )) = 2 2 p X r Pr a n 2U D(r; a n )]
Fix r, clearly if the machine looks at k segments and then produces a string c which is not equal to one of these segments then the probability that c is a segment of a random unique a n is b 2 n 3n c?k 2 3n ?k (3n2 2n ) ?1 . Thus E(S V 0 (a n )) 2( 3n2 2n ) ?1 and the lemma follows.
Interleaving the two conditions
Let us see how to choose our oracle to ensure that our language is statistical zeroknowledge while diagonalizing over oracle BPP machines. We only need a slight modication to the procedure in section 3.1: let V 1 ; V 2 ; : : : be an enumeration of probabilistic polynomial time turing machines and replace condition 2 by 2 0 .
2 0 . If no redundant a n i exists with p(a n i ) > 2 ?n i nd a unique a n i with p(a n i ) 1 2 and such that S V j (a n i ) 2 2 n i 3n i for j = 1; 2 : : :i. Set A according to this a n i .
Observe that by Lemmas 4 and 6 a random a n i satis es the two conditions with probability 1 ? (4 + i)2 ?n i > 0 and thus there is such an a n i .
Finally, to conclude that the construction is correct we need to verify the following conditions. 1. A is well de ned. 2. For any n, a n is unique, redundant or completely redundant. 3. No BPP A machine recognizes L A . 4. Every V i can be simulated.
Let us verify these conditions one at the time.
(1) We need only observe that no strings of length n i are set under the rst i?1 rounds. This is true since n i > n k k for k < i and thus no M A k can ask about any string of length n i during its computation.
(2) If n = n i for some i, a n is either redundant or unique according to the rules 1 and 2 in the construction. For all other n, a n is completely redundant.
(3) By the construction M A i makes an error on input 1 n i .
(4) Observe that this is only a condition when 1 n 2 L. We know by condition 2 0 in the construction that the distance between the distribution generated by P and V i on input 1 n and the distribution generated by M V i on 1 n is 2 2 n 3n for n n i . This nishes the proof of Theorem 1.
4. An oracle such that PZK 2] B 6 = BPP B .
Using an idea of Oded Goldreich we show how to modify the language and the oracle to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2: There exists an oracle, B, such that PZK B 2] 6 BPP B .
We will de ne a new language L 0 B which is very similar to the previous language. This time we let b n denote the characteristic vector of elements of B with leading 0 and length n + 1. That is, b n i = 1 () 0i 2 B \ n+1 :
Now we de ne a unary language L 0 B by b n unique () 1 n 2 L 0 B :
Again we will make sure that b n is either unique, redundant, or completely redundant.
The key di erence is that we will use strings in the oracle starting with 1 as a dictionary. We let 1x 2 B i jxj = 3n and x is a segment of b n . We will call the characteristic vector of this \dictionary" part d n : for jij = 3n d n i = 1 () 1i 2 B () i is a segment of b n .
The proof of Theorem 2 will be very similar to the proof of Theorem 1 and hence we will omit some details. The proof of Lemma 7 is, of course, very similar to the proof of Lemma 4. However, there are some additional complications due to the dictionary. To take care of these problems we need the following de nition.
Diagonalization over BPP
De nition A machine M makes a discovery if on input 1 n it asks B about a string 1x; jxj = 3n; 1x 2 B and it has not asked any oracle question(s) about a segment of b n with value x.
We get the following lemma.
Lemma 8 The probability that a probabilistic polynomial time machine M, which runs in time n i makes a discovery is n i?1 =3 2 2n . The probability is taken over the coin ips of the machine and over a random b n from either R or U.
Proof: Fix r, consider any question \1x 2 B" with jxj = 3n. The probability that x will be a segment of b n which the machine has not yet seen is 1=3n2 2n . Since M asks at most n i questions the lemma follows.
Let us use this lemma to prove Lemma 7. Consider the set of b n i ; r which makes M B i accept. This set is divided into equivalence classes with pairs giving the same computation of M B i in the same equivalence class. We know that when b n i is given probabilities according to R the total mass of accepting conversations is at most 2 ?n i . When b n i is given proabilities according to U we have accepting conversations of two types: Computations where M B i makes a discovery and computations where it does not. By Lemma 8 the mass corresponding to the rst case is bounded by n i?1 i =3 2 We need to check that this simulator runs in expected polynomial time for any veri er. Assume that the running time of V j is n j . The crucial lemma is:
Lemma 9: The probability that M V j runs in time 3n j+2 is n j?1 =3 2 2n . Furthermore, M V j never runs for longer than n2 n +3n j+2 steps. The proability here is taken over random b n 2 U and r, the random coins of the machine.
Proof: We need only analyze how long M V j runs in the di erent cases. If 1c 6 2 B then M V j runs in time n j + n. If c occurs as one of the segments that V j looked at, the running time is at most n j+2 + n j + n 3n j+2 . In the last case we get the bound n2 n + n j+2 + n j + n. To nish the proof we need only observe that to get into the last case the veri er has to make a discovery and hence we can use Lemma 8.
However we are more interested in probabilities over r for a xed choice of b n and this is taken care of by our last lemma.
Lemma 10: For a fraction 1 ? 2 ?n of U the expected running time of M V j is bounded by 4n j+2 for all j.
Proof: By Lemma 9 the fraction of U for which M V j has probability 2j 2 n j?1 =3 2 n of running in time 3n j+2 is 2 ?n (2j i for all j. Set B according to this b n i . We just need to observe that, by Lemmas 7 and 10, a random b n i satis es the two conditions with probability 1 ? 7 2 ?n i > 0. A simple veri cation similar to that in section 3.3 nishes the proof of Theorem 2.
Remarks
We would like to remark here about the relative strength of PZK and SZK. Recall our relativized PZK language L 0 . Occassionally, the simulator was required to make an exponential search of 0x (jxj = 2 n ) because the veri er produced a segment of b n without making queries in the segment. Importantly, the simulator knew when it was necessary to make such a search (by looking in the dictionary) and the search was rarely necessary. This is precisely the same way in which all know SZK languages also have perfect zeroknowledge simulators (as noted in GMR2]) The perfect simulator can determine when it is necessary to make an expontial time computation and the computation is rarely necessary.
However, our SZK language does not seem to have this property. When the veri er has produced a string but has not made queries in a segment of the oracle which looks like the string, the simulator has no way of knowing whether the string is a segment of b n , i.e., whether to make an exponential search. It seems that in order for a simulation to be perfect it must make the exponential search whenever the above occurs but such a simulation certainly will not run in expected polynomial time.
